The plaintiff argued that its mark had acquired international reputation and recognition, which extended to India through its extensive presence, publicity, and services offered worldwide. It was further contended that Dingle Buildcons adopted the mark dishonestly with the intent to ride on the reputation and credibility of Keller Williams. The plaintiff also emphasized that such unauthorized use was detrimental to its brand image and risked misleading prospective customers.

The defendant, Dingle Buildcons, failed to appear before the Court, leading the matter to proceed ex parte. The Court examined the evidence placed on record by Keller Williams, including trademark registrations, promotional material, and documents highlighting the company’s international standing. Based on this, the Court observed that the plaintiff’s trademark was distinctive, well-known, and deserved protection under Indian trademark law.

In its judgment, the Court held that the unauthorized use of the Keller Williams mark by Dingle Buildcons amounted to infringement and passing off. It further emphasized that allowing such acts would not only harm the plaintiff but also mislead the general public who could be duped into believing that the services offered by the defendant were associated with the reputed international brand. Consequently, the Court granted a permanent injunction in favor of Keller Williams, restraining Dingle Buildcons from using the mark or any deceptively similar variant. Additionally, the Court awarded damages to the plaintiff, thereby reinforcing the principle that intellectual property rights, especially of well-known international brands, must be safeguarded in India.

This case highlights the significance of protecting trademarks and the strong stance of Indian courts against infringement, particularly where the infringer seeks to exploit the reputation of a globally established entity. It also underlines the importance of businesses exercising vigilance in monitoring unauthorized use of their intellectual property to preserve brand value and consumer trust.

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This case arises from a petition filed by Rescom Mineral Trading FZE, a company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates and engaged in mining and trading of minerals, against Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (RINL), a Public Sector Enterprise operating the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant. The petition was filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim measures to secure claims of approximately USD 16.5 million (about INR 139 crores).

The dispute traces back to a long-term agreement executed between the parties in August 2023 for the supply of Tuhup Hard Coking Coal. Under the arrangement, Rescom was to supply coal while RINL was required to make payments through letters of credit. Over time, due to RINL’s financial difficulties, the terms were amended to allow open account payments. Rescom supplied about 77,465 metric tons of coal under five invoices, with payment due by August 2024. However, only partial payments were made, leaving a substantial outstanding balance.

The petitioner alleged that RINL was in serious financial distress, citing its reported losses exceeding Rs. 2,800 crores and liabilities far outweighing assets. It was argued that without securing the claim, any arbitral award in favor of Rescom would risk becoming meaningless. Interim measures such as attachment of coal stock, security in the form of bank guarantee, and restrictions on disposal of assets were sought.

RINL, on the other hand, denied liability for the full amount, contending that the coal supplied did not meet quality specifications, with the ash content exceeding contractual limits. On this basis, it claimed entitlement to a rebate and disputed additional charges such as hull cleaning and demurrage, which the petitioner had raised due to delayed berthing of the vessel. RINL further argued that it had already made part payments and also supplied steel worth over Rs. 40 crores to the petitioner’s subsidiary. It emphasized that being a Central Public Sector Enterprise, it was supported by significant government infusions, including recent equity and working capital assistance, which ensured its financial stability and ability to honor any arbitral award.

The Court examined whether interim relief could be granted solely on the ground of financial distress. It referred to precedents of the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court, which establish that for an order of attachment or security under Section 9, a strong prima facie case must exist, supported by evidence of attempts to dissipate assets or defeat enforcement of an arbitral award. Mere financial weakness, without proof of dishonest intent, was held insufficient. The Court also noted that the claims raised by Rescom were unadjudicated, disputed on both quantum and quality grounds, and hence could not be secured at this stage.

While acknowledging that dues remained outstanding, the Court found that RINL had continued to make payments and there was no evidence of asset dissipation. It also took note of the higher threshold required when granting interim reliefs against public sector enterprises involving public revenue. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm.

The petition was therefore dismissed. However, the Court clarified that these observations were confined to the interim application and would not prejudice the arbitration proceedings, where the disputes regarding quality of coal, rebates, and outstanding dues would be finally adjudicated. Both parties were given liberty to approach the Arbitral Tribunal for appropriate reliefs under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act once it is constituted.

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Yatra presented that it had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation over nearly two decades, serving millions of customers and registering several domain names incorporating the word ‘YATRA’. It argued that the Defendant’s adoption of ‘BookMyYatra’ was dishonest and intended to ride on Yatra’s established reputation. The Plaintiff further relied on its long-standing usage, brand recognition, and legal precedents to assert that the Defendant’s actions amounted to infringement and unfair competition. It contended that the similarity in marks would mislead consumers into believing that both businesses were connected, causing irreparable harm to its goodwill.

The Defendant, however, opposed these claims, arguing that the word ‘YATRA’ is a common Hindi term meaning “journey” and has been widely used by several travel operators across India and abroad for decades. It contended that Yatra could not monopolize a generic and descriptive word. The Defendant also highlighted that the Plaintiff’s registrations for certain marks carried disclaimers specifically denying exclusive rights over the word ‘YATRA’. It further argued that its mark, when viewed as a whole—‘BookMyYatra’—was distinct and could not cause confusion with ‘YATRA’ or ‘YATRA.COM’. Additionally, it pointed out that Yatra itself had abandoned several domain names and was attempting to unfairly block competition in the industry.

The Court carefully analyzed whether the Plaintiff could claim exclusivity over the word ‘YATRA’. It observed that while Yatra had developed a strong brand presence, the term ‘YATRA’ is inherently generic and descriptive of travel, which cannot be monopolized under trademark law. The Court emphasized that for a descriptive term to acquire secondary meaning, its primary meaning must be lost to the public and become solely associated with a single source. In this case, the Court found no evidence that ‘YATRA’ had acquired such exclusive distinctiveness. The disclaimer in the Plaintiff’s registrations further weakened its claim.

The Court also noted that when viewed as a whole, the Defendant’s marks ‘BookMyYatra’ and ‘BookMyYatra.com’ were sufficiently distinguishable from the Plaintiff’s device marks and word marks. The use of the prefix “BookMy” created a distinct impression, and reliance on “.com” provided no exclusivity since it is a generic top-level domain. Citing established precedents, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff could not prevent others from using the word ‘YATRA’ in relation to travel services, especially as numerous businesses already use the term legitimately.

After weighing the arguments, the Court held that no prima facie case was established by Yatra for continuing the interim injunction. The Plaintiff’s request for restraining the Defendant from using ‘BookMyYatra’ or its related domain names was dismissed.

This case highlights the crucial principle that generic and descriptive words, especially those linked to the nature of a service, cannot be monopolized under trademark law. While Yatra remains a leading player in the travel sector, it cannot claim exclusivity over the word ‘YATRA’, which is widely understood as “journey” and commonly used in the travel industry. The decision reinforces the balance between protecting established brands and ensuring fair competition by preventing monopolization of everyday language.

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The Assessing Officer concluded that income of ₹19.24 crores from the licensed software was taxable as royalty. However, the assessee argued that the transaction merely allowed the use of copyrighted material and not the copyright itself, and hence could not be treated as royalty. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) relied on the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in DIT v. Infrasoft Ltd., holding that consideration received from software licensing is not taxable as royalty, as no copyright is transferred, only a limited right to use copyrighted material. The Commissioner further noted that retrospective amendments brought by the Finance Act, 2012, could not override treaty provisions under the DTAA.

The Revenue appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), contending that the decision in Infrasoft was not applicable to the present facts. The ITAT, however, dismissed the appeal by relying on the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, which had settled the issue by holding that payments made by Indian distributors or end-users to non-resident software suppliers for the use of software through End User License Agreements (EULAs) or distribution agreements do not constitute royalty. The Supreme Court clarified that such payments do not grant any right to use the copyright itself, and therefore no income arises in India for taxation. Consequently, no obligation to deduct tax at source under Section 195 of the Act arises in such cases.

The High Court, while considering the Revenue’s appeal, noted that the Revenue did not dispute the applicability of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. to the present case. Since the Supreme Court had already conclusively settled the issue, the Court held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

This judgment reaffirms the legal position that software licensing arrangements, where only limited rights to use copyrighted software are granted, cannot be taxed as royalty under Indian tax law or applicable DTAAs. The decision underscores the binding effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Engineering Analysis on all similar disputes, ensuring consistency and clarity in tax treatment of cross-border software transactions.

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The Delhi High Court recently dealt with an important question concerning the treatment of Common Area Maintenance (CAM) charges under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case, Commissioner of Income Tax – TDS-01 vs. Diamond Tree, decided on 6 August 2025, involved appeals filed by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Act challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Delhi Bench. The appeals related to the assessment years 2011-12 and 2015-16.

The core issue before the Court was whether CAM charges should be subjected to Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) under Section 194I, which deals with rent, or under Section 194C, which relates to payments made under a contract for work. The Assessing Officer had earlier treated the assessee as an assessee-in-default for short deduction of tax on CAM charges, arguing that such charges formed part of rent and thus attracted a higher rate of TDS under Section 194I. The ITAT, however, ruled in favour of the assessee by holding that CAM charges were contractual payments for services, falling under Section 194C.

The Tribunal relied on earlier decisions in Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT and Kapoor Watch Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, where it was clearly established that CAM charges cannot be equated with rent. Instead, such payments were recognized as payments towards services like maintenance, cleanliness, and common facilities. The Tribunal observed that these charges were separate from the rental component, and therefore, tax should be deducted at 2% under Section 194C, rather than the higher rate applicable under Section 194I.

When the matter reached the High Court, Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue, Mr. Ruchir Bhatia, fairly conceded that the issue was already settled by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)-1, Delhi v. Liberty Retail Revolutions Limited. In that case, the Court had categorically held that CAM charges are not rent but shared expenses for maintenance and services, and therefore, fall within the ambit of Section 194C. The Court had clarified that only payments made for the use of land, building, or equipment could be considered rent under Section 194I, whereas CAM charges are contractual in nature.

The High Court also noted that two similar appeals, Commissioner of Income Tax-TDS-01 v. Bose Corporation India Pvt. Ltd., had already been dismissed earlier in August 2025, affirming the same principle. Thus, in the present matter, the Court found no reason to take a different view. It reiterated that CAM charges cannot be treated as lease rentals or license fees and, accordingly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.

Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed, and the decision of the ITAT in favour of the assessee was upheld.

This judgment reinforces the settled legal position that CAM charges are in the nature of contractual payments for services and are liable for TDS deduction at the lower rate under Section 194C of the Act. It provides much-needed clarity for businesses, landlords, and tenants alike, ensuring uniformity in the tax treatment of such charges across similar transactions.

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The Delhi High Court recently dealt with an important issue concerning tender disputes in the case of M/S Ceigall India Limited vs National Highways Authority of India & Others decided on 13 August 2025. The case revolved around whether a typographical error committed by a bidder while submitting its financial bid could be treated as a bona fide mistake or whether it should attract penal consequences, including forfeiture of bid security.

The petitioner, Ceigall India, challenged the actions of the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) after its bid for the Sambalpur Bypass project in Odisha was declared non-responsive. The project, valued at over Rs. 1,086 crores, required bidders to furnish a bid security of Rs. 10.87 crores. Ceigall submitted its bid in figures as Rs. 1220,00,00,000 (Rs. 1220 crores) but inadvertently mentioned in words “Rupees One Thousand Two Hundred Twenty only”, omitting the word “crores.” This discrepancy led NHAI to treat the bid amount as Rs. 1220/-, a figure entirely unfeasible for the scale of work involved. Subsequently, NHAI proceeded to forfeit 5% of the bid security and initiated steps for encashment.

Ceigall immediately clarified its position on 26 and 27 March 2025, explaining that the omission was a typographical error and affirming its willingness to execute the project at Rs. 1220 crores. Despite this, NHAI insisted on enforcing the tender condition that required the amount in words to prevail in case of inconsistency, justifying forfeiture under Clause 2.20.7(a) of the Request for Proposal (RFP).

The Court examined whether such an error should be treated as inadvertent and bona fide. It referred extensively to two recent Supreme Court decisions: Omsairam Steels and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. vs Director of Mines and Geology (2024) and ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India (2025). In both cases, bidders had committed critical errors in quoting figures, leading to disproportionate penal consequences. The Supreme Court had applied the doctrine of proportionality, recognizing that while bidders are expected to exercise utmost care, mistakes that are clearly unintentional cannot attract severe penalties that would cause undue hardship or result in commercially absurd outcomes.

Applying these principles, the High Court found that Ceigall’s error was inadvertent and bona fide. It noted that NHAI could have easily identified the mistake, given the size and nature of the project, and sought clarification from the bidder. Instead, it chose to impose a penalty without exercising discretion. The Court observed that both parties had made inadvertent errors and that strict enforcement in such a situation would not serve public interest.

Accordingly, the Court quashed NHAI’s communications dated 27 and 29 March 2025, which had directed forfeiture of the bid security. However, applying proportionality, it directed Ceigall India to deposit Rs. 15 lakhs with NHAI as a cautionary measure, to reinforce the need for diligence in tender submissions. The Court also clarified that no further penal action, such as debarment, would follow from this incident.

The case is significant as it underscores the balance courts seek to maintain between upholding the integrity of the tender process and preventing disproportionate hardship caused by genuine mistakes. It reaffirms that while tenderers must exercise the highest level of care, public authorities are also expected to act reasonably and proportionately when dealing with such errors.

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The case of M/s Nageswara Trade vs Joint Commissioner of Customs was heard on 13 August 2025, concerning the seizure of goods imported by the petitioner. The matter was argued under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, where the petitioner challenged the seizure of multi-functional devices including printers and photocopiers that had been imported against a Bill of Entry dated 10 September 2024. The seizure was carried out on 2 January 2025 without specifying any violation on the part of the petitioner, which became a central issue in the proceedings.

The petitioner sought relief through multiple prayers, including setting aside the seizure memo, unconditional release of the imported goods, issuance of a detention certificate to waive charges for the detained period, and any other orders deemed appropriate by the Court. It was contended that the seizure memo was handed over to the petitioner belatedly on 28 March 2025, almost three months after the date mentioned, making the seizure irregular and invalid.

Initially, the petitioner moved an application for provisional release of the goods. The Court, in its order dated 29 May 2025, permitted the petitioner to approach the Customs Department for provisional release. The Department, however, rejected the request on 16 June 2025, citing that the imported devices were prohibited under prevailing rules unless supported by Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification or exemption from the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. The Department relied on Circular No. 35/2017-Customs which bars provisional release of prohibited goods.

The petitioner argued that this circular had already been declared void by earlier judgments, including Its My Name Pvt. Ltd. (2021) and Shanus Impex (2024), where Courts held that such restrictions went beyond the powers granted under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962. It was submitted that other High Courts, including Telangana and Madras, had permitted provisional release of similar goods upon imposition of reasonable conditions, demonstrating inconsistency in the Customs Department’s approach.

On the other hand, the Customs Department maintained that the petitioner had suppressed earlier petitions and that the devices were not BIS-certified. It was also argued that such goods could be hazardous and were prohibited under Section 46(4A) of the Customs Act and relevant waste management rules.

The Court, after examining the statutory provisions and earlier decisions, reiterated that Section 110A permits provisional release of seized goods pending adjudication, and that the Customs circular could not override the statute. The Court noted that provisional release could not be absolutely barred, and conditions could be imposed to protect both public interest and the revenue.

Accordingly, the Court directed that the petitioner’s goods be released provisionally on specific conditions. These included calculation of applicable duty on the goods valued at Rs. 47,56,947/-, payment of 50% of the duty by the petitioner, and execution of a bond covering any other duties or penalties that may arise. Upon fulfillment of these conditions, the goods were to be released within one week. The adjudication proceedings under the show cause notice, however, were allowed to continue in the ordinary course of law.

With these directions, the petitions and pending applications were disposed of, and the Court cancelled the next scheduled hearing date.

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However, even before the contract could be executed, the company was served with a show cause notice in October 2022 alleging violation of the Integrity Pact, based on a CBI case against its employee. SRSC Infra responded by denying the allegations, asserting that mere registration of an FIR did not justify punitive action. The company also attended a personal hearing before MoRTH. Despite this, a debarment order dated 7 February 2023 was issued against it, though this order was never communicated to the petitioner.

Due to an oversight, the LOA was still issued on 14 February 2023. Subsequently, in March 2023, MoRTH informed that SRSC Infra had been debarred for three months. Based on this, the LOA was cancelled on 10 April 2023. This prompted the petitioner to challenge both the cancellation and the debarment.

The court examined the record and found serious procedural lapses. The debarment order was never served on the petitioner, which meant that the company had no knowledge of the adverse action until it was cited in official filings. Further, the order did not deal with the detailed defence submitted by SRSC Infra. The court emphasized that principles of natural justice require not only a show cause notice but also a reasoned order that considers the defence of the affected party. The absence of communication itself made the debarment unsustainable in law.

Referring to earlier Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the court observed that blacklisting or debarment has grave consequences and cannot be imposed in an arbitrary or mechanical manner. Since the order was neither communicated nor reasoned, it stood vitiated. Accordingly, both the debarment order of 7 February 2023 and the cancellation of the LOA dated 10 April 2023 were quashed.

The court noted that the LOA had been issued more than two years after the tender was floated, and that the contract agreement had not yet been executed due to the intervening events. Therefore, while directing that the execution of the agreement with SRSC Infra may proceed, the court left open the option for the government to scrap the tender altogether and re-issue it if it considered the project commercially unviable due to the passage of time. The court clarified that in such an event, SRSC Infra would still be free to participate in the fresh tender process.

Finally, the court also safeguarded the petitioner’s right to claim damages or monetary relief for losses suffered due to the wrongful cancellation of the LOA. The petition was thus disposed of with these directions.

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The dispute between Kailashpati Polyplast Pvt. Ltd. and Raghav Industries arose out of dishonoured cheques issued by the Respondent, which led to multiple complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The matter escalated due to repeated procedural applications filed during trial, with the controversy centering on the admissibility of electronic evidence and the filing of a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Petitioner filed five complaints against the Respondent, alleging dishonour of cheques worth five lakh rupees each. The Respondent was summoned, charges were framed, and evidence was led by both sides. During the proceedings, the Petitioner attempted to rely upon a Tracking Report to prove service of a legal notice. However, contradictions emerged when the Respondent made conflicting statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in his testimony as a defence witness. This prompted the Petitioner to move repeated applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. (now Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) for bringing additional evidence on record.

The first application sought permission to place invoices and delivery receipts, but was dismissed. The second application, seeking examination of a postal authority to prove service of notice, was allowed, though the witness ultimately confirmed that the relevant record had been weeded out. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a third application to introduce a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, supporting the Tracking Report already on record. The Trial Court dismissed this application on 21 July 2025, noting that it was filed after final arguments and appeared to be an attempt to fill evidentiary gaps.

Aggrieved, the Petitioner challenged the dismissal before the High Court, relying on precedents such as Ram Kishan vs. Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, where it was held that a Section 65B certificate can be produced at any stage before the conclusion of trial. The Petitioner argued that the omission was inadvertent and that justice required allowing the certificate on record. The Respondent, however, maintained that the application was belated and intended only to cover deficiencies highlighted during final arguments, stressing that the Petitioner had ample opportunities earlier in the trial.

The Court carefully considered the legal position that procedures are meant to aid justice and that Section 311 Cr.P.C. grants wide discretion to summon or recall witnesses. However, it also emphasized that such discretion cannot be used to unfairly disadvantage the opposite party. In this case, the Court observed that the Petitioner had consciously chosen not to rely on additional witnesses or certificates earlier, instead depending on the Respondent’s partial admissions regarding service of notice. Only when objections were raised during final arguments did the Petitioner move the third application. The Court held that this amounted to an attempt to cure lacunae in evidence rather than a genuine procedural necessity.

Relying on settled principles that procedural law must not be misused, the Court concluded that the third application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. lacked merit. It dismissed the petitions, observing that although courts generally lean towards permitting additional evidence in the interest of justice, each case must be judged on its own facts. Here, the timing and circumstances clearly indicated that the Petitioner’s request was belated and unjustified.

Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions filed by Kailashpati Polyplast Pvt. Ltd. were dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.

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The matter arose when the claimant approached the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). After conciliation failed, the dispute was referred to the DIAC for arbitration. The claimant did not submit the Statement of Claim despite repeated reminders, leading the DIAC to close the proceedings in October 2018. Several months later, in 2019, the DIAC informed the appellants that the claimant had filed the Statement of Claim and directed them to submit their Statement of Defence.

Challenging this development, the appellants contended that the DIAC had no authority to revive closed proceedings without a fresh reference from the MSEFC. They argued that under Section 18(5) of the MSMED Act, a reference must be completed within 90 days, and that the closure in 2018 terminated the mandate. Citing Section 25 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, they further argued that the failure to file the Statement of Claim had ended the arbitral mandate, and that no sufficient cause was shown for the delay.

The Court, however, found no merit in these arguments. It clarified that the 90-day period in Section 18(5) applies to the reference process, not the arbitration itself, and that the provision is directory, not mandatory, because it does not specify consequences for non-compliance. This interpretation, the Court observed, aligns with other statutes where similar timelines have been held to be non-mandatory in the absence of penalties.

As for the revival of proceedings, the Court upheld the view of the learned Single Judge that such matters, being linked to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, should be addressed under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Referring to Supreme Court decisions in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., and Bhaven Constructions v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., the Court emphasized that judicial interference once arbitration has commenced is to be exercised sparingly.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that procedural and jurisdictional challenges in arbitration should be raised before the tribunal itself. The judgment reinforces the autonomy of arbitral proceedings and clarifies that statutory timelines without explicit consequences are generally intended to be directory rather than mandatory.

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