In a recent matter between Aneja Constructions (India) Ltd and Doosan Power Systems India Private Ltd, the Delhi High Court was called upon to consider whether the arbitral tribunal had rightly permitted a delayed filing of the Statement of Defence (SoD) and Counter-Claim by the respondent, despite the timeline stipulated under the Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) Rules, 2024. The petitioner, Aneja Constructions, had approached the court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the arbitral tribunal’s decision not to strike off the respondent’s defence and counter-claim as time-barred.

The arbitration was initiated in accordance with Rule 15 of the ICA Rules, 2024, upon Aneja’s notice of request for arbitration along with its Statement of Claim (SoC). In accordance with Rule 18(a), the ICA Registrar forwarded the SoC to the respondent on 06.12.2024, thereby setting a deadline of 06.01.2025 for the respondent to file its SoD and any counter-claim. An extension of 30 days was granted upon request, extending the deadline to 05.02.2025. However, instead of filing its response within the extended time, Doosan Power sought a further extension of 12 weeks.

The arbitral tribunal was constituted and scheduled its first hearing on 12.04.2025. Doosan filed its SoD and counter-claim shortly thereafter, on 14.04.2025. Aneja’s objection was premised on Rule 18(a) of the ICA Rules, which allows only one extension not exceeding 30 days for the filing of a defence. Thus, according to Aneja, the respondent’s subsequent filing was in violation of procedural timelines, and the tribunal had no authority to entertain or condone such delay absent a specific agreement between the parties.

Relying on the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—particularly Sections 2(8) and 25(b)—Aneja contended that procedural rules agreed to by the parties must be strictly adhered to and that the arbitral tribunal lacked the power to go beyond those timelines without express consent. The petitioner emphasized that under Section 25(b), if the respondent fails to file its defence without sufficient cause, the tribunal may treat the right to file as forfeited. Since there was no consent for further extension, Aneja sought to have the defence and counter-claim removed from the record.

The Court, however, was not persuaded. Citing settled jurisprudence, it reiterated that judicial interference in arbitral proceedings under Article 227 must be minimal and only warranted in exceptional circumstances, such as instances of perversity, bad faith, or jurisdictional error. It referred to earlier decisions including Kelvin Air Conditioning & Ventilation System (P) Ltd. v. Triumph Reality (P) Ltd. and IDFC First Bank Limited v. Hitachi MGRM Net Limited, which underscore the principle that arbitral tribunals are autonomous forums and procedural deviations—unless patently unjust or mala fide—do not merit constitutional interference.

The Court emphasized that the ICA Rules, being institutional and procedural in nature, do not carry the weight of statutory enactments. Consequently, their interpretation and enforcement rest with the arbitral tribunal, especially when such rules are silent on strict non-extendability beyond a certain period. It was further noted that Rule 18(a) lacks the peremptory phrases such as “not exceeding” or “but not thereafter” that would otherwise mandate strict interpretation.

In its detailed reasoning, the arbitral tribunal had acknowledged the importance of procedural efficiency but prioritized the overarching goal of doing substantive justice. It held that, while timelines are critical, they should not hinder a fair adjudication, particularly where sufficient cause is shown for the delay and the opposing party has not contested the adequacy of such cause. The tribunal had also clarified that rules framed by arbitration institutions do not override the tribunal’s inherent authority to ensure that justice is served in the arbitral process.

The Court concurred, affirming that rules of procedure are tools meant to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it. It observed that reducing arbitral tribunals to mere procedural gatekeepers would defeat the purpose of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. It reiterated that procedural rules must be interpreted liberally and should not frustrate the broader objective of fair and expeditious resolution.

Concluding that the impugned order by the arbitral tribunal was neither perverse nor passed in bad faith, and that no exceptional circumstances were made out, the Court dismissed the petition at the preliminary stage. It held that the arbitral tribunal was within its rights to allow the delayed filing and had exercised its discretion judiciously and in the interest of justice.

Accordingly, all pending applications were disposed of, and the petition was dismissed in limine. This decision serves as a reaffirmation of the principle that while institutional rules guide the arbitration process, they cannot override the tribunal’s power to ensure a fair hearing and equitable justice.